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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether failure to record a Quit-Claim Deed of joint tenant to 
appellant prior to death of joint tenant terminated joint tenancy 
and whether right of survivorship immediately vested entire 
ownership in surviving joint tenant (appellee) upon death of joint 
tenant. This is an ancillary issue to whether summary judgment and 
award of attorneys fees under Rule 11 U.R.Civ.P. was appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has eliminated or improperly characterized many 
facts. Appellee submits the following, all of which are 
uncontroverted. 
Defendant-appellant Mower is the step-son of plaintiff-
appellee and the son of Nellie D. Crowther who died on August 9, 
1991. (Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Defendant's Answer. Appendix, 
Appelleefs Brief.) 
Appellee was married to Nellie D. Crowther at the time of her 
death and was a joint tenant with her at the time of her death in 
the following described property located in Summit County, Utah, to 
wit: 
The West 1/2 of Lot #17 and the East 1/2 of 
Lot #18, Weberwild Estates, Plat "A,11 a 
subdivision. 
(Exhibit ffB,n Appellee's Complaint.) 
On December 16, 1988, W. Paul Wharton, a Salt Lake City 
attorney representing Nellie Crowther, sent a letter to Appellant 
on behalf of his mother, Nellie Crowther, enclosing a Quit-Claim 
Deed to her one-half interest in the subject property, together 
with a Codicil to her Will and Deed to other property. The 
pertinent parts of Mr. Wharton's letter are: 
Enclosed are the originals of three documents: 
a) a Quit-Claim Deed regarding the house at 
2620 Elizabeth Street in Salt Lake City; b) a 
Quit-Claim Deed regarding some recreational 
property in Summit County; and c) a Codicil to 
your Mother's Will. Keep them in a safe 
place. 
As you know, your Mother wanted to be sure 
that you receive a 1/2 interest in her 
property; her intention is to leave the other 
1/2 to her step-children. There are two 
possible chain of events — either your Mother 
dies before her husband does, or she dies 
after he does. If she dies first, you should 
promptly, as soon as it is possible, record 
the two deeds with the respective County 
Recorder. If your step-father dies first, I 
would suggest you contact me (after you've 
discussed matters with your Mother). We will 
need to know whether Dean Crowther did 
anything to affect or alter the ownership or 
testamentary disposition of his portion of the 
property, before we can decide what needs to 
be done with the Deeds. 
(Appendix B, Appellant's Brief.) 
The Quit-Claim Deed from Nellie D. Crowther to appellant Bryan 
Mower which was forwarded to him by W. Paul Wharton on December 16, 
1988, was not recorded until August 15, 1991, two and one-half 
years later, and six days after the death of Nellie Crowther. 
(Appendix C, Appellant's Brief.) 
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At the hearing on the summary judgment on March 8, 1993, Judge 
Young explained the effect of failure to record a deed to which 
appellant replied: 
Well, that's taking a risk. There's no 
question about it. There is a risk involved. 
And I knew that risk when I took the deeds. 
One thing I was . . . . 
(Underscoring ours; Page 3, Partial Transcript.) 
Appellant's Answer alleges the Deed to appellant was not 
recorded until Mrs. Crowther's death, "in order to avoid ridicule 
and fear Mr. Crowther would take action against her.11 (Paragraph 
9, Appellant's Answer; Appendix Appellee's Brief.) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Action was filed to quiet title alleging equivocable delivery 
of a Quit-Claim Deed by Nellie's attorney to appellant and that the 
failure to record the same prior to her death failed to terminate 
the joint tenancy. Appellee's position is that upon the death of 
Nellie her interest in the property immediately vested in the 
appellee, the surviving joint tenant. 
Appellee contended the appellant's "pro se" Answer and defense 
was knowingly not well-grounded in fact or warranted by existing 
law and lacks good faith thereby justifying an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees in favor of appellee. On April 14, 1993, appellee 
was awarded Summary Judgment quieting title to the property and 
attorney's fees. After the hearing on the motions for Summary 
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Judgment on March 8, 1993, and prior to the filing of the Notice of 
Appeal herein, appellant filed a number of ill-founded and spurious 
documents in the district court, including a Motion for 
Reconsideration, Objection to Plaintiff's Version of Court Order 
and Motion to Reconsider Attorney's Fees. All of these documents 
are largely unintelligible and contain erroneous legal half-truths, 
none of which are well grounded in fact or warranted by existing 
law. Appellee claims additional attorney's fees should be awarded 
by this Court pursuant to Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P., and Rule 40(a) 
U.R.App.P. 
ARGUMENTS 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 
AS THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY 
MATERIAL FACT AND APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
This issue is so intertwined with the issue as to the effect 
of failure to record Nellie's Quit-Claim Deed to appellant that it 
is deemed advisable to combine the argument of both issues. 
It is fundamental that summary judgment should be granted 
where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
(Rule 56C, U.R.Civ.P.) 
The primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure is, of 
course, to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing a party to pierce 
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the allegations of the pleadings and determine whether there is a 
genuine issue of material fact. 
In the instant case, all the basic documents determinative of 
the rights of the parties were admitted and received by the trial 
court. The controlling, undisputed facts in this case revolve 
around the letter of W. Paul Wharton, dated December 16, 1988, 
which by its terms confirms that the Quit-Claim Deed to defendant 
was not to be recorded until after Nellie's death. Under the terms 
of the letter, if Mr. Crowther died first, appellant was to contact 
Mr. Wharton (after he discussed matters with his mother). Thus, 
Nellie intended to review the situation, and retained the right to 
reclaim or recall the Deeds. In fact, the letter provides, "We 
will need to know whether Dean Crowther did anything to affect or 
alter the ownership or testamentary disposition of his portion of 
the property, before we can decide what needs to be done with the 
deeds." (Appendix B, Appellant's Brief.) 
The joint tenancy was not severed until the death of Mrs. 
Crowther since the Quit-Claim Deed was not recorded until some days 
after her death. Title to the entire joint property upon her death 
instantaneously vested solely in appellee/plaintiff. 
It is elemental that the Quit-Claim Deed could have been valid 
as against appellee only if it had been recorded prior to Nellie's 
death. 
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Survivorship dictates that upon the death of 
one joint tenant, his interest in the property 
immediately vests in the remaining joint 
tenant(s) and does not pass through the 
decedent's estate. Thus a joint tenant cannot 
devise his interest in land by will or have 
his interest descend to his heirs under laws 
regulating intestate succession. 
Moynihan, C, Introduction to the Law of Real Property, 210 (1988) . 
Mr. Wharton's letter clearly instructed Bryan to record the 
Deed only if Mrs. Crowther died before Mr. Crowther, otherwise he 
was directed to discuss the matter with his mother and to call Mr. 
Wharton if Mr. Crowther predeceased Mrs. Crowther. 
Thus, the letter is controlling evidence of her uncontroverted 
intent, i.e., that if Mr. Crowther died first Mrs. Crowther 
intended to review this situation and thus retained the right to 
claim or recall the Deeds. Further, the evidence is uncontroverted 
that Nellie's intent was not to record the Deed until after her 
death "in order to avoid ridicule and fear Mr. Crowther (appellee) 
would take action against her." (5 9, Defendant's Answer; 
Appendix, Appellee's Brief.) 
In any event, the failure to record the Deed for some two and 
one-half years is fatal to appellant's case. 
Counsel for the plaintiff submitted an Affidavit in Support of 
the Attorney's Fees pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-505, Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, and pursuant to Rule 11, 
U.R.Civ.P. (TR 78-0081.) 
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This Court has held that attorney's fees can be awarded in 
connection with summary judgment decisions. Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, (Utah App. 1989). The court discussed at 
length the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the award of attorney's fees in connection with 
the summary judgment. Attorney's fees were awarded on summary 
judgment upon undisputed material facts which entitled the 
plaintiff to the award based upon the affidavit filed in accordance 
with Utah statutes. 
Judge Orme pointed out that sanctions under Rule 11 are 
imposed on an objective basis and not limited to the subjective 
"bad faith" approach, and whether specific conduct amounts to a 
violation of Rule 11 is a question of law. 
Appellant has filed no affidavit of impecuniosity and should 
be bound by reasonable inquiry as to the facts and law before 
signing and filing the ill-founded and irresponsible documents 
filed herein. By failing to conduct this inquiry, appellant has 
violated Rule 11 and Rule 40(a), U.R.App.P. This neglect has 
caused plaintiff to incur substantial legal expense since the 
trial. 
Appellee respectfully urges the Court to order sanctions, 
including reasonable attorney's fees for the use and benefit of his 
attorney pursuant to Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P. and Rule 40(a) U.R.App.P. 
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The lack of reasonable inquiry on the part of appellant is apparent 
from a cursory examination of the files and records in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that appellee is entitled to an 
order of this Court affirming the judgment of the trial court and 
awarding reasonable attorney's fees to appellee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERL C. RITCHIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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APPENDIX 
Bryan D. Mower 
Defendant 
#5 Quietwood Ln. 
Sandy, UT 84092 
(801)572-1012 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN W. CROWTHER 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRYAN D. MOWER Civil No. <?A/ / £ 3 - / 
Defendant. 
Defendant's answer to plaintiff allegations: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and the 
son of Nellie D. Crowther, Who died on August 9, 1991. 
3. Plaintiff was married to Nellie D. Crowther at the time of her death. 
4. On December 15,1988, Nellie D Cowther wrote a codicil to her last 
will and testament. In the codicil, she stated her intentions to quick-claim deed 
one-half interest in her real property. (Exhibit A) This property consisted of: 
The West 1/2 of Lot #17 and East 1/2 of lot #18, Weberwild Estates, Plat "A11, 
a subdivision as recorded in the Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, 
Utah, together with all improvements thereon. 
5. Interest in the Weberwild property in Summit County was attained 
by virtue of a quick-claim deed dated December 15,1988 and delivered to 
Defendant via certified mail on December 16,1988. 
6. The quick-claim deed was delivered to defendant legally via 
certified mail along with a letter from Utah Legal Services outlining Nellie 
Crowther's intentions. 
7. Upon Nellie Crowther's death, the deed was recorded at the Summit 
County Courthouse. It was Nellie Crowther's wishes and desire to give to her son 
(Defendant) her undivided interest in the Summit County property. These wishes 
were carried out when the deed was delivered to the Defendant. 
Notwithstanding the fact, Bryan Mower is legally entitled to a one-half interest in 
the said property. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. Defendant incorporates herein all of the answers of paragraphs 1 
through 7. 
9. Delivery of the deed was unconditional as indicated by the codicil. 
(Exhibit A.) Mr Paul Warton, Attorney, Utah Legal Services, suggested the deed 
be recorded subsequent to Mrs. Crowther's death in order to avoid ridicule and 
fear Mr. Crowther would take action against her. Mr. Warton used precatory words 
such as "suggest" and "should" which do not naturally import a legal obligation. Mr 
Warton designated Mrs. Crowther's intention to "be sure her son received 1/2 
interest in her property" by sending the quick-claim deed. This deed could have 
legally been recorded at any time subsequent to delivery. 
10. Mr. Crowther's attorney's fees should not be paid by defendant due 
to the fact this action was initiated totally by the plaintiff. In addition, no bad faith 
was exhibited in that it was Mrs. Crowther who initiated the original transaction 
while the defendant was living in the state of California. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant demands judgment against plaintiff as follows: 
1. On his first Cause of Action for a judgment in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff decreeing that said deed was legally and lawfully given to 
Defendant by his mother, Nellie D. Crowther, prior to her death via quick-claim 
deed, and legally recorded her intentions in a codicil to her Last Will and 
Testament. 
2. On the Second Cause of Action that attorney's fees be paid by 
Defendant, it is asked that no fees be awarded due to the fact that Mrs. Crowther 
initiated original transaction and Mr. Crowther filed the complaint. No bad faith on 
the part of the defendant occurred. 
DATED this /J /jda^ of Obteber, 1992 
Bryan D. 
Defendant's Address: 
#5 Quietwood Ln. 
Sandy, UT 84092 
FIRST CODICIL TO THE 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF 
NELLIE D. CROWTHER 
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, being at least eighteen years of age, of sound mind and 
memory, and acting under no restraint or duress of any kind, do 
hereby make, publish and declare this instrument to be the FIRST 
CODICIL to my Last Will and Testament executed on the 11th of 
August, 1987, at Salt Lake County, Utah, and do hereby republish 
said Will with the following change: 
The second paragraph of tne section entitled "RESIDUARY 
LEGATEES'1 is revised in its entirety to read as follows: 
In the event that DEAN W. CROWTHER does not survive me, 
I give all of the rest, residue and remainder of my property, 
whether real, personal or mixed, and wherever situated, together 
with any property over which I may have power of appointment to my 
son and step-daughters, named above, as follows: I have by 
Quit-claim Deed, given to my son one-half of my home and other 
real property; I hereby give the other half of each, if I have 
received an interest by the probate of DEAN W. CROWTHER's estate 
or otherwise, to my three step-daughters. All of the rest of my 
estate I give to the four children, share and share alike. In the 
event that one or more of my children predecease me, each deceased 
child's share of my estate shall be equally divided amonf that 
child's children. 
1 of 3 
EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT 
I, NELLIE D. CROWTHER, the Testatrix, sign my name to 
__. ,, day of // ( u
 t r. f< Cv—- , 1988, 
and beir 7 first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned 
authority that I sign and execute this instrument as the FIRST 
CODICIL to my Last Will. 
/9. /dJ^J 
NELLIE D. CROWTHER 
and 
/? ^//^LS^ ^z/. (/ 's^^^y^?^^^^^ / t^e witnesses, sign our 
names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby 
declare to the undersigned authority that the Testatrix signs and 
executes this instrument as the FIRST CODICIL to her Last Will and 
that she signs it willingly and that each of us, in the presence 
and hearing of the Testatrix and of each other, hereby signs this 
Codicil as witness to the Testatrix's signing, and that to the 
best of our knowledge the Testatrix is eighteen years of age or 
older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence-
In the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, on this .-r^ *\ 
day of ^>„ , ,. ^  y>^ r^" , 1988, before me, the undersigned 
Notary, personally appeared NELLIE D. CROWTHER, the Testatrix, 
[] who is personally known by me 
ryiwho proved to me her identity through documentary evidence 
^ i n 'the form of y^y- Cvs ^  „v •.~ \ v \ > ^  ^ »S^x v^ -s , 
to be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document, 
who duly acknowledged to me that she has read and fully 
understands it, executed the same voluntarily and for the purposes 
set forth, and that she was acting under no constraint or undue 
influence whatsoever. 
Also personally appeared before me the witnesses 
[] who is personally known by me 
nwho proved to me his/her identity through documentary evidence 
'^in the form of vyr ^ V L-^i: > \ A < -— . - > ^> ^ - ^ 
and £Z c\> K(, ?•> v^S V C ^ N ^ c 




who proved to me his/her identity through documentary evidence 
the form of 
to be the persons whose names are signed on the preceding 
document, and who each^acknowledged to me that this document is 
signed voluntarily for its stated purpose. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: vsrv-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^ day of September, 1993, 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the 
following, by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage 
pre-paid, addressed as follows: 
Bryan D. Mower 
#5 Quietwood Ln. 
Sandy Utah 84092 
^^£L^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 9 1993 
• / • Mary T. Noonan 
r Clerk of the Court 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of September, 1993, two 
true and correct copies of the Brief of Appellee were served on the 
appellant by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage 
pre-paid, addressed as follows: 
Bryan D. Mower 
#5 Quietwood Ln. 
Sandy Utah 84092 
I further certify that two copies of the Appelleefs Summary of 
Argument were served by mailing to said appellant at said address 
on the 27th day of September, 1993. 
VERL C. RITCHIE 
Attorney for Appellee 
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